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BROKER-DEALER RESPONSIBILITY IN
REGULATION D TRANSACTIONS
I.

Introduction

On March 16, 1982, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) adopted a set of six rules that provide issuers of small limited
offering transactions exemption' from the registration requirement of
the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act).2 Collectively known as
Regulation D,3 the rules are intended to clarify and simplify existing
exemption rules in an attempt to expand their availability.4
Much has been written regarding the duties imposed upon an issuer
in a Regulation D transaction.5 Commentators have not, however,
1. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501- 230.506 (1988). The adoption of Regulation D is authorized by § 19(a) of the 1933 Act. Securities Act of 1933, § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1982)
(the SEC has the authority to make rules and regulations governing registration statements of certain securities). Rules 504 and 505 are promulgated pursuant to § 3(b) of the
Securities Act and Rule 506 is promulgated with respect to § 4(2) of the Securities Act.
Securities Act of 1933, § 3(b), § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), 77d(2) (1982). See infra note
22 for the text of § 3(b) and note 23 for the text of § 4(2).
As this Note was being published, the SEC adopted Rules 507 and 508. Rule 507
eliminates the filing of form D as a condition for establishment of any exemption under
Regulation D. Rule 508 is the "Good Faith" exception. Rule 508 provides that a failure
to comply with the requirements of Regulation D will not necessarily result in the loss of
the registration exemption. To qualify for the good faith exception, the issuer must
demonstrate that the requirement he violated is not directly intended to protect the complaining party, the failure to comply was insignificant under the circumstances, and a
good faith effort was made to comply with the regulations. Regulation D, Accredited
Investors and Filing Requirements, 54 Fed. Reg. 11369 (1989) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.507-230.508).
2. Securities Act of 1933, § 5(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
3. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988) (Title preceding Regulation D).
4. Beginning with Rule 144 in 1972, the SEC has consistently made attempts to
clarify the private offering exemption for potential offerors. Parnall, Kohl & Huff, Private
and Limited Offerings After a Decade of Experimentation:The Evolution of Regulation D,
12 N.M.L. REV. 633 (Spr. 1982) [hereinafter Parnall, Kohl & Huff]. Regulation D is
intended to provide regulatory guidelines in which issuers may rely on issuing unregistered securities. Id. Moreover, because the Securities Act does not provide a definition of
public offering, Rule 506 is intended to provide objective guidelines where an offer or sale
of a security will not be considered a public offering. Id. See also L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 315 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Loss]; 7A J. HICKS,
EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, § 7.01[3] (1987).
Regulation D "is designed to simplify and clarify existing exemptions, to expand their
availability and to achieve uniformity between federal and state exemptions in order to
facilitate capital formation consistent with protection of investors." W. PRIFTI, SECURITIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS 4-13 (1983) [hereinafter PRIFTI]; see also S.E.C.
Release No. 33-6389 (Mar. 8, 1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 11261 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Coles, Regulation D - New Rules for Raising Capital In Non-Public
Financing,70 ILL. B.J. 612 (1982) (discussing the availability of Regulation D); Parnall,
Kohl & Huff, supra note 4 (same); Moliney, Regulation D: Coherent Exemptions for
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addressed the degree of care a broker-dealer 6 must exercise in a Regulation D transaction in order to insulate himself from potential liability7 to the purchasers.' The preliminary notes preceding the rules in
Regulation D make clear that issuers of a Regulation D offering are
subject to the anti-fraud' and civil liability provisions1 ° of the securiSmall Businesses Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 121 (1982)
(same).
6. A broker is "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank." Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982). A dealer is "any person engaged in the
business of buying and selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for
his own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a
regular business." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)
(1982).
7. The preliminary notes preceding Regulation D state clearly that transactions
under Regulation D are subject to the anti-fraud and civil liability provisions of the federal securities laws. Preliminary Notes, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988). Consequently, broker-dealers who are "sellers" within the statutory scheme of § 12(2) may
incur liability under § 12(2). See infra notes 103-21 and accompanying text for discussion
of sellers.
8. A partial explanation for the absence of commentary may be the lack of case law
on this topic. Since Regulation D is relatively new, there is currently no decision involving the § 12(2) reasonable care standard in Regulation D transactions. Accordingly, this
Note relies on the statutory purpose of Regulation D and past case law construing the
purpose of the private offering exemptions.
9. Section 17(a) is the general anti-fraud provision of the Securities Act. See T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs 506 (1985 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter HAZEN]. Section
17(a) provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
It is unresolved whether a private right of action exists under § 17(a). Compare In re
Connor Bond's Litigation; First Fin. Sav. Bank, Inc. v. American Bankers Ins. Co., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,970, at 90,530 (E.D.N.C. July 21,
1988) (recognizing private right of action under 17(a)) and Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing an implied private right of
action under § 17(a)) and Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d. Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979) (same) and Daniel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d
1223, 1244-46 (7th. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (same) with
Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,174, at
91,592-91,597 (7th Cir. Jan 19, 1989) (refusing to recognize a private right of action
under § 17(a)) and Norma v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,914, at 90,086, (D.C. Mass. May 5, 1988) and Bruce v. Martin,
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[Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,927, at 90,211 (S.D.N.Y. July
15, 1988) and Johnston v. Wilbourne [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,947, at 90,394 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 20 1988) and Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Group Inc.,
[Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,018, at 90,762 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 7, 1988)
and Leonard v. Shearson Lehman Am. Express, Inc. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 93,942, at 90,359 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1988) and Kaufman v. Amtax
Planning Corp., 669 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) and Ackerman v. Clinical Data, Inc.,
[1985-86 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,207, at 91,566 (S.D.N.Y. July 8,
1985) and Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 384-91 (5th Cir. 1982) and
Blumberg v. Berland [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,389, at
92,361 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (same) and Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596, 604
(7th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 363, reh'g denied, 384 U.S. 915 (1966)
(same). See also Stern v. Grossman, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,025 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that no private right of action exist under § 17(a), suggesting that the Second
Circuit will hold that no private right of action exists under 17(a)).
The counterpart to § 17(a) in the Exchange Act of 1934 is § 10(b), which provides in
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Act of 1933, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the SEC under the authority granted in § 10(b), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
Although a private right of action exists under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, see Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983) (the aggrieved purchaser must prove
scienter on the part of the defendant to sustain a cause of action). Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976). Consequently, unless
the plaintiff can prove scienter on the part of the defendant, the plaintiffs are left to the
remedies made available in §§ 11 and 12. Note, "Reasonable Care" in Section 12(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 372, 373 (1981) [hereinafter Reasonable
Care]. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Sante Fe Indus., held that § 10(b) requires proof
of "manipulation" or "deception" and not a "mere" breach of fiduciary duty. Sante Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977).
10. Under the Securities Act, an issuer of securities may incur civil liability under
§§ 11 and 12. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771 (1982). Under § 11
an issuer will incur liability when the registration statement contains "an untrue statement of a material fact or a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading ....
Securities Act of 1933, § 11(a), 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982). Liability is based on the registration statement and therefore § 11
is not applicable to exempt offerings due to the lack of a registration. Securities Act of
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ties laws. 1 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder,12 which limits suits under section 10(b), 13 and Rule
lOb-514 actions to those plaintiffs who can prove scienter, 5 an aggrieved purchaser who cannot prove scienter may seek relief under
section 1116 and section 12(2) 17 of the Securities Act. Because section
11 applies only to registered securities, and while section 12(2) applies
1933, § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982). Accordingly, broker-dealer liability in Regulation D transactions is found under § 12 of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
Section 12(1) provides civil liability for seller's failure to register securities as required
under § 5 of the 1933 Act. Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982). For a
definition of "seller" within the § 12(1) context, see Pinter v. Dahl, 56 U.S.L.W. 4579,
4584-88 (U.S. June 15, 1988). In Lewis v. Walston & Co., the Fifth Circuit imposed
liability on a broker for the unauthorized sales of unregistered securities by the broker's
registered representatives. 487 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1973). This Note will not discuss
liability under § 12(1) because it assumes that a broker-dealer involved in a Regulation D
offering makes certain that the issuer has complied with the requirements set forth in
Rules 501 to 503. See infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text for the conditions to be
followed.
Liability under § 12(1) is one of strict liability; therefore, the intent and knowledge of
the seller is irrelevant. See Loss, supra note 4, at 883; M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 390 (1986) [hereinafter STEINBERG]. According to Professor Loss, the plaintiff
need only prove: (1) that the defendant was the seller; (2) that some means of interstate
commerce was used to facilitate the sale; (3) that the defendant failed to comply with the
registration requirements; (4) that the suit was brought within the statute of limitations
and; (5) that adequate tender was made when the plaintiff is seeking rescission. Loss,
supra note 4, at 883. The seller's only defense is that the security in question is exempt
from the requirements of § 5. See Loss, supra note 4, at 883. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act is the primary source of liability for the broker-dealer in light of Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196, which had the effect of remitting aggrieved purchasers who
cannot prove scienter to the remedies available in § 12(2). Section 12(2) provides in relevant part:
Any person who(2) offers or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact ... and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such
untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from
him ....
Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). See also Reasonable Care,
supra note 9, at 373.
11. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa; Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a - 78111 (1982).
12. 425 U.S. 185. The Court held, inter alia, that the language of the statute and its
legislative history clearly imply that scienter is required on the part of the defendant for
liability under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5. Id. at 197-206.
13. Securities Act of 1933, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). See supra note 9 for the
text of § 10(b).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). See supra note 9 for the text of Rule lOb-5.
15. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193.
16. Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
17. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
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liability to unregistered securities, an aggrieved purchaser of Regulation D securities is remitted to the explicit remedies for negligent nondisclosure under section 12(2).18
This Note examines the responsibilities a broker-dealer has under
section 12(2) in Regulation D transactions. Part II outlines the general framework of Regulation D. Part III examines the section 12(2)
liability for Regulation D sellers, and Part IV determines responsibilities a broker-dealer has with respect to Regulation D transactions.
The Note concludes that because the private placement market 19 generally consists of those persons who are sophisticated and knowledgeable in financial matters, these investors do not need the full
protection of the Securities Act's registration requirements. ConseD transactions should
quently, broker-dealers involved in Regulation
2°
not be required to exercise "due diligence."
II.

Framework of Regulation D

The SEC, under the authority granted by section 19(a) 21 and pursuant to section 3(b) 22 and with respect to section 4(2)23 of the 1933 Act,
promulgated Regulation D to relieve the small offering issuer from
18. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 278 (1987) [hereinafter
BLOOMENTHAL]. The chief function of § 12(2) is to reinforce § 11 so that the securities

laws may reach those who sell securities that are unregistered and consequently outside
the scope of § 11. Id. at 278.
Section 12(1) liability is not discussed in this Note. Section 12(1) provides liabilities for
those issuers who sell unregistered securities as required under § 5 of the Securities Act.
For cases discussing 12(1) liability, see Pinter v. Dahl, 56 U.S.L.W. 4579 (U.S., June 15,
1988); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1988); Swenson v. Engelstad,
626 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1980); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980); Lawler v.
Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978); Crooker v. SEC, 161 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1947);
Schillner v. Vaughan Clark & Co., 134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943).
19. See N. PRIFTI, supra note 4, at 1-31. Prifti claims that there are three types of
private markets: (1) an initial private purchasers (noninstitutional) market; (2) an initial
private purchasers (institutional) market; and (3) a resale by private purchasers to other
private purchasers market. Id. Regulation D offerings involve only type 1 and 2 market
types because resales of Regulation D securities are prohibited under Rule 502.
20. Section 11 of the Securities Act provides a "due diligence" defense against liability if the defendant can show "after reasonable investigation [he had] reasonable
ground[s] to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement
became effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission
...." Securities Act of 1933, § 11(b)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1982).
21. Securities Act of 1933, § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1982) (the Securities Act
grants the SEC the authority to make rules and regulations governing registration
statements).
22. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982). Section 3(b) provides in
relevant part:
The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations, . . .add
any class of securities to the securities exempted as provided in this section, if it
finds that the enforcement of this title ... with respect to such securities is not
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the demanding and expensive24 burden of registration under the 1933
Act.25 Congress provided this exemption for small offerings2 6 with a
limited number of participants. 2 The rationale behind the small offering exemption is that the public benefits of registration are too re2
mote to justify the imposition of the expensive and time consuming
registration process 29 upon issuers of small offerings. Consequently,
section 3(b) permits the SEC to promulgate rules and regulations to
exempt issuers from registration if "it finds . . . [registration] is not
necessary [for] the public interest and for the protection of investors
by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the
public offering .... 3 Section 4(2) of the Securities Act provides an
exemption from registration if the issuer is "not involv[ed] in any pubnecessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of
the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering ....
Id.
23. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). Section 4(2) provides in
pertinent part that the provision of § 77e [§ 5] of this title shall not apply to "transactions
by an issuer not involving any public offering." Id.
24. Registration of securities in preparation for a public offering can cost more than
$100,000. HAZEN, supra note 9, at 8.
25. The registration process is designed with the intent that appropriate information
be filed with the SEC to ensure that members of the investing public have adequate information on which to base their investment decisions. See Loss, supra note 4, at 89; see also
HAZEN, supra note 9, at 31. Accordingly, the registration statement is the basic disclosure document that must be filed with the SEC for compliance with the 1933 Act's registration requirement. See Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). There are
many forms for registration depending on the nature of the issuer and/or the circumstances surrounding the offering as well as the types of the securities that are offered. See
Loss, supra note 4, at 147. As a general rule, there are two parts to the registration
statement. The first part contains the prospectus which includes material information
such as the issuer's name, the state of the issuer's incorporation, and the location of the
principal place of business. Part two contains additional information that is not distributed in the prospectus but which is made available, through a registration filing with the
SEC, for public inspection. See HAZEN, supra note 9, at 31-50. For conditions required in
a complete registration statement, see Regulation C, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400-230.494
(1988).
26. Small offerings for purposes of this Note are those offers made pursuant to § 3(b)
and § 4(2) of the Securities Act. It should be noted, however, that § 4(2) is not a small
offering in terms of amount restriction. Section 4(2) is discussed in this Note due to Rule
506 and its implication with respect to Regulation D. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3(b),
4(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), 77d(2) (1982).
27. Regulation D contains three types of offering exemptions that are differentiated
by the dollar amount of the offering. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-230.506 (1987). In addition,
issuers are limited as to the number of purchasers dependent on the type of issues. Id.
28. There are various disadvantages of going public in connection with the sale of
securities, such as the expense of registration and the additional regulation, and market
pressure to perform. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1986 GOING PUBLIC HANDBOOK 3-1 to 3-2
(1986) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
29. See supra note 24.
30. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982).
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lic offering." ' Since an issuer of an exempt offering is relieved of the
burdens of registration, it is the burden of the issuer to prove the
availability of the exemption. 2
A.

Preliminary Notes to Regulation D

Regulation D is introduced by seven preliminary notes. 3 The preliminary notes begin by explaining that Regulation D issuers remain
subject to the anti-fraud provisions and certain civil liability sections
of the federal securities law.3 4 They also make clear that issuers are
obligated to update information 5 as necessary to ensure that information already furnished is not misleading,3 6 and stress that compliance
with Regulation D does not exempt issuers from compliance with applicable state securities laws. 7 The notes also provide that the exemptions available under Regulation D are not the exclusive means of
obtaining exemptions from registration under the 1933 Act, and that
attempted compliance with Regulation D does not act as an election
of such exemptions. 3a For example, if an issuer fails to meet the condition for Rule 506, he may nonetheless qualify for exempt offering
31. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). Unlike § 3(b), which
sets a maximum dollar amount at $5,000,000, Securities Act of 1933, § 3(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(b) (1982), § 4(2) does not contain any dollar limitation on the amount of the private offering, Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
32. See Lively v. Hirschfels, 440 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1971) (issuer is required to
prove availability of private exemption); Parker v. Broom, 820 F.2d 966, 968 (8th Cir.
1987) (the burden of proving a private offering rests upon the issuer); see also Loss, supra
note 4, at 274-75.
33. See Preliminary Notes, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988).
34. See Preliminary Note 1, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988).
35. See id. Although specific disclosure is not required, public information must be
updated to guard against misstatements. See Preliminary Notes, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501230.506 (1988).
36. See Preliminary Notes, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988).
37. See Preliminary Note 2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1987). Regulation D is
meant to be uniform with state securities laws. See Regulation D-Revision of Certain
Exemptions from Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-82 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83106, at 84,907 (Mar. 8, 1982). The SEC related that one of
the objectives of Regulation D is to "develop a basic framework of limited offering exemptions that can apply uniformly at the federal and state levels." Id. at 84,909. For
example, if there is an offering under Rule 504 that complies with the blue sky law of the
state in which the security is offered, the restriction on resale and the manner of offering
will not apply. Id. at 84,909; see also California Casualty Management Company, SEC
No-Action Letter, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,940, 79,532
(Apr. 17, 1985).
38. Preliminary Note 3, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988). If the issuer is unable
to fulfill the conditions set forth in Regulation D, the issuer may attempt to obtain exemptions available in other sections of the 1933 Act. R. ELKINS & L. MEEKS, REGULATION

D, A-4 (1986) [hereinafter

ELKINS & MEEKS].
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under section 4(2). 39
Since Regulation D is intended to apply only to transactions, securities purchased through a Regulation D offering may not be resold

unless they are accompanied by a registration statement or fall independently within an exemption.4" The notes confirm that Regulation
D is available for issues during business combinations.4 1 Regulation D

is not available, however, when it is part of a plan or scheme to evade
the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.4 2 Finally, note 7 explains that sales to foreign persons made outside of the United States
need not comply with the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.43
B.

Rules 501 to 506

Regulation D may be divided into two parts. Rules 501 to 503 set
forth the general terms and conditions to be complied with when of-

fering issues under Regulation D." Rules 504 to 506 set forth the
specific exemptions available under Regulation D. 45
1.

Rules 501 to 503: Generally Applicable Provisions

Rule 501 provides definitions for terms used throughout Regulation
D. 4 6 One very important term is "accredited investor.

47

The con-

cept of an accredited investor supplements that of a sophisticated pur39. See ELKINS & MEEKS, supra note 38.
40. See Preliminary Note 4, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988).
41. See Preliminary Note 5, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988). "Business Combination" means those transactions "specified in paragraph (a) of Rule 145 under the Securities Act and any transaction involving the acquisition by one issuer, in exchange for
all or a part of its own or its parent's stock, or stock of another issuer, if immediately after
the acquisition, the acquiring issuer has control of the other issuer .....
ELKINS &
MEEKS, supra note 38, at A-26.
42. See Preliminary Note 6, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988).
43. See Preliminary Note 7, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988). On October 25,
1988, the SEC proposed a new Rule 144A under the Securities Act which would provide
a safe harbor exemption from the requirements of the Securities Act for resale of securities to institutional investors. See SEC Release No. 33-6806 (October 25, 1988).
44. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.503 (1988).
45. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-230.506 (1988).
46. Rule 501 provides definitions of: accredited investor, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)
(1988); affiliate, id. § 230.501(b); aggregate offering price, id. § 230.501(c); business combination, id. § 230.501(d); calculation of number of purchasers, id. § 230.501(e); executive officer, id. § 230,501(f); issuer, id. § 230.501(g); and purchaser representative, id.
§ 230.501(h). The SEC has proposed that plans established and maintained by state governments and their political subdivisions, including their agencies and instrumentalities,
for the benefit of their employees, be included in the definition of "accredited investor."
See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulation D Revision to Accredited Investor Definition, 54 Fed. Reg. 308 (1989).
47. Under Regulation D, if the issuer is dealing only with accredited investors, the
Rules do not require that he provide specific information for any amount of sale. 17
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chaser4 8 concept by using the financial status of the potential investor
to determine whether the purchaser is sophisticated and knowledgeable in financial matters.4 9 The existence of non-accredited purchasers
determines the scope of information to be provided by the issuer, for
the issuer will be obliged to provide specific information only in the
event that he sells to non-accredited purchasers." In addition, the
number of purchasers under a Rule 505 and 506 offering is limited to
thirty-five.5"
Rule 502 sets forth four conditions applicable to all offers and sales
C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(i) (1988). Rule 501(a) provides in relevant part that an accredited
investor is:
(1) any bank; ... any insurance company;.., investment company;... small
business investment company; ...employer benefit plan; . . . any broker or
dealer registered pursuant to § 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ...
(2) any private business development company... ;
(3) any organization . . .not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the
securities offered with total asset in excess of $5,000,000... ;
(4) Any director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer ... or any
director, executive officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer;
(5) any natural person whose individual net worth ...exceeds $1,000,000... ;
(6) any natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in
each of the two most recent years, or joint income with that person's spouse in
excess of $300,000 in each of those years, and has a reasonable expectation of
reaching the same income level in the current year;
(7) Any trust with total assets in excess of $5,000,000, not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, whose purchase is directed by a
sophisticated person... ;
(8) Any entity in which all of the equity owners are accredited investors under
paragraphs (a)(1),(2),(3),(4),(6), or (7) of this section.
17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1988).
Anyone not fitting into one of the above categories is considered a non accredited purchaser. The term accredited investor becomes important when a broker dealer has to
determine what degree of reasonable care is due to the purchase and the transaction. See
infra notes 119-65 and accompanying text. The SEC has now included "those governmental employee benefits plans that have total assets in excess of $5 million" within the
definition of accredited investor. Regulation D, Accredited Investor and Filing Requirements, 54 Fed. Reg. 11369 (1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 230.507-230.508).
48. A "sophisticated purchaser is one who is knowledged and experienced in financial
and business matters that demonstrate the ability to evaluate a prospective investment."
Seldin, Who Cares About the Accredited Investor?, 15 REV. OF SEC. REG. 810 (1982).
49. Those who are sophisticated in financial matters are able to fend for themselves
without the benefits of disclosure. SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953); See
also Parker v. Broom, 820 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1987). But see Quincy Coop. Bank v. H.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1986) (a sophisticated investor is entitled to the same full protection and disclosure requirements as a naive investor).
50. If all of the issuer's purchasers are accredited, Regulation D does not require that
specific information be provided to the purchasers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1)(ii) (1988).
51. Both Rule 505(b)(2)(ii) and Rule 506(b)(2)(i) require that the issuer reasonably
believe that there are no more than 35 purchasers of securities from the issuer. 17
C.F.R., §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii), § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (1988). The term "purchasers in this instance does not include "accredited investors." Id. § 230.501(e).
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made under Regulation D. 52 The first condition to be met is the condition, against integration.5 3 Integration is to be avoided so that the
issuer will not exceed the maximum amount allowed under rules 504506. To avoid integration, a Regulation D offering may be offered six
months before or after other offers and sales.5 4 Further, such other
offers and sales must not have been similar to those in Regulation D.5
The second condition consists of the requisite types of information
and their methods of presentation to purchasers.5 6 If the issuer is selling only securities under section 230.504 or is selling only to accredited investors, Rule 502 does not require that specific information be
provided to the purchasers. However, if the sale of securities is under
Rule 505 or 506 and any of the purchasers is not an accredited investor, information as specified in Rule 502(2) must be provided. The
third condition is the prohibition on general solicitation and publication.5 8 Unless the issuer is selling securities under Rule 504 and is
selling exclusively in states that require registration and disclosure,
Rule 502(c) prohibits any use of general solicitation or general advertising.59 Furthermore, Rule 502(d) also prohibits resale.60 Securities
acquired in accordance with Regulation D offerings have the same
unregistered status as securities acquired under section 4(2) of the
1933 Act and thus may not be resold without registration.6 1
In addition to these three conditions, Rule 502 expressly states that
the issuer is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to make certain
that purchasers are not underwriters.6 2 An underwriter as used in
this provision means a "person that has been paid or will be paid
remuneration for solicitation of purchasers ... 63 The duty to make
certain that the purchasers are not underwriters includes a reasonable
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1988).
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1988); see also SEC Release No. 33-6455, 2637-11 (1983).
Id.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (1988). For a synopsis of information to be provided, see
STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 122-23.
57. Id.
58. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1988). Rule 502 prohibits the use of general solicitation
or general advertising in connection with the offer or sale of the issuer's securities in
reliance on Regulation D. Printing Enterprise Management Science., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,415, at 78,513 (Mar. 23,
1983) [hereinafter Printing Enterprise].
59. Printing Enterprise, supra note 58, 77,415, at 78,513.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1988).
61. Id.; cf. Lively v. Hirschfelds, 440 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1971) (discussing private offering under § 4(2)).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (1987).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(iii) (1988).
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inquiry as to whether the purchaser is acquiring the security for him-

self or another, and the provision of written disclosure of the limitation on resale and placement of a legend on the securities certificate
indicating their unregistered status.64 Rule 503 provides requirements

for filing notice of sale with the SEC in compliance with Form D,65
and provides a notice of sale by requiring the issuer to file Form D.66
Rule 503 provides further that a seller of Rule 505 securities must
provide to the SEC all information furnished to non-accredited purchasers upon a request by the Commission.67
2. Rules 504 to 506: Specific Exemptions
The second set of Rules under Regulation D provides the specific
exemptions available based on the size of the offering. 68 The three exemptions are distinguished principally by the maximum dollar
amount of the offering permitted under each exemption.
a. Rule 504 Exemption for Small Issues of $1,000,000 or Less
Rule 504 exempts from registration offerings of up to $1,000,000 in
any twelve-month period. 69 The Rule 504 exemption is not available
to investment companies7 ° and companies that are reporting compa-

64. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d)(1),(2),(3) (1988).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (1988).
66. 17 C.F.R. § 239.500 (1988).
67. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(c) (1988).
68. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-230.506 (1988). Rule 504 has a maximum amount of
$1,000,000; Rule 505 has a maximum amount of $5,000,000; and Rule 506 does not
contain a maximum dollar limitation. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-230.506 (1988).
69. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (1988). The SEC utilizes an aggregate method of
accounting. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(C) (1987). Under this method, an issuer may sell securities totaling less than $1,000,000 so long as in any 12 month period, the issuer does not
sell more than $1,000,000 worth of exempt securities. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 n.1 (1987). In
1988, the SEC increased the amount limitation from $500,000 to $1,000,000 provided
that no more than $500,000 is attributable to offers and sales without registration under
state securities laws. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2)(i) (1988).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1988). The 1933 Act classifies investment companies based
on their form of organization and operation. HAZEN, supra note 9, at 572.
Section 3(a) of the Investment Act provides a definition of investment company:
"Investment company" means any issuer which(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has
any such certificate outstanding; or
(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting,
owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such
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nies within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."' As
a general rule, offers and sales under Rule 504 must conform to conditions set forth in Rules 501, 502, and 503,2 unless the offering is conducted exclusively in states that require registration and delivery of a
disclosure document before the sale.7 3 There is no specific information
required under Rule 504 that must be furnished to purchasers,74 yet a
Regulation D offering is nevertheless subject to the federal anti-fraud
provisions and certain civil liability provisions.7"
b.

Rule 505 Exemption for Limited Offerings Not
Exceeding $5,000,000

Rule 505 provides an exemption for limited offerings not exceeding
$5,000,000 in any twelve-month period. 6 Unlike a Rule 504 offering,
a Rule 505 offering may be madeto an unlimited number of accredited investors, 7 but to only thirty-five non-accredited investors.7 " An

accredited investor is defined in Rule 501 as a person who comes
within, or whom the issuer has reasonable grounds to believe comes
within, any of the eight listed categories of investors.7 9 As with Rule
504 offerings, Rule 505 offerings must comply with the conditions set
issuer's total asset (exclusive of government securities and cash items) on an
unconsolidated basis.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1982).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1988). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13, 15(d), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1982). For a discussion of reporting companies, see HAZEN,
supra note 9, at 233-53.
72. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (1988).
73. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(i) (1988). If the Rule 504 offering is made exclusively
in states that already require registration and disclosure statements, the limitation on
solicitation and resale will not apply. Id. For example, an offering under California's
Corporate Securities Law that is conditioned on offeror's delivery of a disclosure statement to the offeree would be an offering in a state that requires registration and delivery
of a disclosure before the sale as is required under Rule 504. See Geraldine D. Green,
SEC No-Action Letter, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,360, at
78,338 (Dec. 22, 1982); California Casualty Management Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,940, at 79,533 (Apr. 17, 1985)
74. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(i) (1988).
75. See Preliminary Notes, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988).
76. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1988). For an explanation of the 12 month condition,
see supra note 69.
77. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (b)(2)(ii) (1988). For calculation of number of purchasers, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (1987).
78. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii) (1987).
79. The categories include: institutional investor; private business development companies; tax exempt organization; directors, executive officers and general partners of the
issuer; $150,000 purchasers; $1,000,000 net worth test; $200,000 income test; and entities
made up of certain accredited investors. See also supra note 45.
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forth in Rules 501 to 503.80
c.

Rule 506 Exemption Without Regard to Dollar Amount

Rule 506 provides an exemption for offers and sales of securities
without regard to dollar amount."' The SEC promulgated Rule 506
from section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempting distributions of securities that do not involve any public offering.8 2 General solicitation
or advertising is not permitted.8 3 Rule 506 permits the sale of securities to an unlimited number of accredited investors and to thirty-five
non-accredited purchasers with the condition that the seller reasonably believe that the purchaser, or his purchase representative,8 4 be
sophisticated and knowledgeable in financial investments.8 5

III. Section 12(2) Liability
Transactions exempt from registration are not exempt from the
anti-fraud provisions86 or from the express civil liability 7 sections of
the federal securities laws. Issuers of Regulation D securities will be
subject to the anti-fraud provisions in the 1933 Act 88 and 1934 Act. 9
In the absence of an allegation of fraud, the aggrieved purchaser of
securities acquired pursuant to Regulation D may seek to invoke sec80. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1988); see also supra notes 32-40 and accompanying
text.
81. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1988).
82. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). While Rule 504 and
Rule 505 offerings are exempt from registration because of their small amount, in addition to their nonpublic nature, a Rule 506 offering is exempt from registration solely due
to its nonpublic nature. In a SEC Ruling, the SEC stated that "Rule 506 is a safe harbor
rule under [§] 4(2) of the Securities Act available to any issuer ....There is no limit to
the amount that may be raised under this exemption." SEC Ruling, Regulation D Revision, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 84,054, 88,400 (Jan. 16, 1987).
83. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(C) (1988).
84. In certain instances, a broker-dealer may function as a purchaser representative.
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(h) (1988). In this situation he may incur liability in that role. See
Stern, Potential Liability of PurchaserRepresentatives, 39 Bus. LAW. 1801 (1984).
85. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506b(2)(ii) (1988). The Rule 506 exemption explicitly requires
that an issuer must reasonably believe that purchasers who are not accredited purchasers
have knowledge and experience in financial and business matters such that he or his
purchaser representative is capable of determining the merits and risks of the investment.
Id. The SEC has also noted that all offerees and purchasers must possess the requisite
level of sophistication in an offering under § 4(2). SEC Release No. 33-6455, Q & A 73,
2380 (Mar. 3, 1983). Because Rule 506 is promulgated pursuant to § 4(2), Rule 506
offerees and purchasers must also possess the requisite level of sophistication.
86. See supra notes 8-9, infra notes 119-65 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 9.
88. See Preliminary Notes, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1988).*
89. Id.

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XVII

tion 12(2) of the 1933 Act and its negligence standard. 90
Section 12(2) affords a purchaser of a security an express right of
action against the seller 9 if the purchaser acquired the security by
means of a prospectus 92 or oral communication containing a material
misstatement or omission.9 3 The statutory language in section 12(2)

indicates that the plaintiff suing under section 12(2) need not bear the
burden of establishing seller's scienter. 94 Rather, the defendant must
bear the burden of proving that he did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care, could not have known of the omission or untruth
of the statement.95 The Congressional committee report deemed this
shift in the burden of proof "as both just and necessary, inasmuch as
the knowledge of the seller as to any flaw in his selling statements, or
the failure of the seller to exercise reasonable care are matters in regard to which the seller may readily testify
"9....
96
A.

Broker-Dealer as Seller

The characterization of the relationship between the purchaser and
the broker-dealer may be dispositive of section 12(2) liability. 97 Due
to the nature of the rules in Regulation D prohibiting public solicitation, an issuer has to employ broker-dealers to get access to potential
investors.98 The degree of a broker-dealer's involvement in a transaction is dispositive of whether he is a seller, and therefore liable to the
purchaser under section 12(2). 9' A broker-dealer who does no more

than act solely as the buyer's agent in executing that buyer's order,
90. The elements of fraud are not a part of § 12(2) liability because it is a negligence
standard provision. HAZEN, supra note 9, at 203.
91. See supra notes 83-90, infra notes 91-105 and accompanying text.
92. The term prospectus means "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale
or confirms the sale of any security .... Securities Act of 1933, § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b
(10) (1982). Consequently, any writing that offers a security for sale comes within the
definition of prospectus in § 2(10). Loss, supra note 4, at 106.
93. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 23-24 (1933).
97. For example a broker-dealer who neither solicited the purchase order nor recommended the securities, and acted solely as the buyer's agent cannot be deemed a seller or
an offeror. Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd,
512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975). Similarly, a broker-dealer has minimal duty, if any, to
investigate the securities when he has merely received and executed a purchase order. Id.
98. See S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 119 (1977) (discussing the accessibility of the private market by issuer of exempt securities) [hereinafter
JAFFE].

99. See STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 391; see also Canizaro, 370 F. Supp. at 287
(brokers must be "sellers" to incur liability under § 12(2)).
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and has neither actively solicited the order nor recommended the securities, is not deemed to be an offeror or a seller."° However, those
who have participated in some significant way in the sales effort, or
have some relationship or connection to the seller, will incur liability
as a seller."'
Thus, before a broker-dealer can incur liability under section 12(2),
it must be established that the broker-dealer is a seller within the
meaning of section 12(2). In regard to this issue, three lines of authority have developed. 102
1.

Strict Interpretation
In Collins v. Signetics Corp.,'

the District Court of the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania employed a strict interpretation of section
12(2) and held that the language of the statute imposes liability only
on the immediate "seller" or one in privity with him." 4 In doing so,
the court concluded that the language of section 12(2) was designed
for claims against immediate sellers and that any other interpretation
would "frustrate the statutory schema."' 5 The court explained that
there are other sections in the 1933 Act which are specifically
designed to reach nonsellers for their misconduct." 6 Similarly, a broker was found not to be a "seller" defendant in an action under sec100. Canizaro, 370 F. Supp. at 287. In instances where the broker does not actively
seek the purchase order, he probably does not "sell" the securities. See Douglas & Bates,
Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 207 (1933) [hereinafter Douglas & Bates].
101. Davis v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1068 (6th Cir. 1984). Consequently, the standard of care under § 12(2) is dictated by the circumstances of each case.
Similarly, the underlying theory of exempt offerings and Regulation D would likewise
impose a standard less than that required under § 11. Douglas & Bates, supra note 100,
at 208 n.205.
102. See Ambling v. Blackstone Cattle Co., 658 F. Supp. 1459, 1465 (N.D. Ill.
1987)
(discussing the three lines of authority in respect to determining seller status).
103. 443 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1979).
104. 605 F.2d at 113; see also Mcfarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 647
(N.D. Cal. 1980) (accountants who signed the prospectus are not sellers for purposes of
§ 12(2) liability).
105. Collins, 605 F.2d at 113; see also Leonard v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express
Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,942, at 90,359 (E.D. Pa.
May 16, 1988). The Seventh Circuit also favored the strict privity approach in Barker v.
Henderson, 797 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1986) (law firm and an accounting firm which
provided services were. not sellers for purposes of § 12(2) liability); accord Schlifke v.
Seafirst Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,174, at 91,592,
91,595 (7th Cir. Jan. 1989).
106. Collins, 605 F.2d at 113. The court distinguished between issuer and seller of
security and pointed to § 11 of the Securities Act as a remedy against an issuer and not an
actual seller. Id. The court in this instance did not consider the case of an unregistered
security which does not come under the purview of § 11. See supra note 10 for text of
§ 11.
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tion 12(2) because the broker did not own the stock and therefore
10 7
could not have passed title.

2. An Intermediate Approach
An intermediate approach, borrowed from tort negligence law, applies the theory of proximate causation. l 8 It defines "seller," for purposes of section 12(2) liability, as one who is integrally involved with
or substantially involved in the offer or sale.19 In SEC v. Seaboard, 10
the Ninth Circuit held that the test in determining seller status is
whether the injury to the plaintiff flowed directly and proximately
from the'action of the defendant seller.I' In determining whether the
injury flowed proximately from the actions of the defendant, the defendant's action must have been substantial in bringing about such an
event." 2 Closely related to this approach is the "participation the-

ory" in which a person is a seller if his participation was a necessary
element in causing the transaction to take place.' 13 Under this approach, the broker-dealer who had remote involvement in the transac107. Steinberg v. Illinois Inc., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,236, at 96,128 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 24, 1987).
108. See, e.g., Davis v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057,. 1067 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985); SEC v. Seaboard Corp. [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 98,720 (9th Cir. 1982); Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 713 (5th Cir.
1980) (seller need not be the one who passed title).
109. Davis, 739 F.2d at 1067.
110. Seaboard, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,720 (9th Cir.
1982).
111. Id., TT 98,720, 98,726.
112. "Substantial factor" is that conduct which was a material and substantial factor
in bringing about the transaction. See Abrams, The Scope of Liability UnderSection 12 of
the Securities Act of 1933: "Participation"and the Pertinent Legislation Materials, 15
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 888 (1987). See Jett v. Sunderman, 840 F.2d 1487, 1491 (9th
Cir. 1988); cf SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 650-52 (1980) (defendant's participation in
offer and sale of the securities was factor in causing the transaction to take place).
113. See Wilson v. Ruffa & Hanover, P.C., 844 F.2d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1988). In Wilson,
the Second Circuit held that a person who is a collateral participant (i.e., did not actually
pass title) can incur liability if there is a showing of "loss causation and transaction causation" by the purchaser. Id. In an analogous case, Pinterv. Dahl, the Supreme Court held
that one who solicits a purchaser is deemed a seller for purposes of § 12(1). Pinter v.
Dahl, 56 U.S.L.W. 4579, 4586 (U.S. June 15, 1988) (No. 86-805). The Supreme Court,
however, agreed with the lower court that a solicitation merely to assist the purchaser
will not itself be enough to incur liability as a seller. Id. Such solicitation must be motivated by self financial interest. Id. In the lower court, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the defendant had not incurred liability as seller even though he was a
substantial factor in causing the transaction to take place. Id. at 4587. The court explained that imposing liability on "sellers" who gave gratuitous advice among family and
friends would be disruptive of social discourse. Id; see also Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v.
IRC Holding Corp., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,091, at
91,095 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1985).
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tion would be protected, while those who were actively involved in
the transaction may incur liability." 4
3.

Broad Interpretation/Aidingand Abetting Analysis

The most expansive approach has extended liability to those who
are co-conspirators and aiders and abettors."I5 In Lorber v. Beebe,"I6
the court extended liability to the defendant, a broker, for participating in the sale as an aider and abettor or co-conspirator in connection
with the fraudulent registration statement."' Under this approach,
anyone who participates, either as a co-conspirator or as an aider and
abettor in the sale of a security that was sold by means of negligent
misrepresentation, may be considered a seller and, therefore, can incur liability."' This view has been criticized as appearing to apply a
scienter standard to the section 12(2) negligence standard-an application which would be inconsistent with the statutory language." 9
An alternative to this approach suggests that liability would require
privity which can be satisfied either through privity of contract or
privity of misrepresentation. 120 This approach argues that privity of
misrepresentation provides the necessary element between the culpable "seller," the purchaser, and the pertinent misstatements.' 2 '
B.

Broker-Dealer Responsibility

Section 12(2) has been described as "one of the most powerful but
least appreciated weapons in the arsenal of a plaintiff in a securities
fraud action."' 122 Section 12(2) is the only express private remedy re114. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 652. (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit, in espousing the participation theory, indicated factors to be considered in determining participant liability: (1) devising the issuer's corporate financing scheme; (2) preparing or
reviewing offering memoranda; (3) meeting personally with broker-dealers or investors
and; (4) participating in promotional seminars or sales meetings. 1d; see also supra note
96 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., DeBraun v. Andromed Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 1276 (D.
Nev. 1979); Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re Caesar's Palace
Sec., 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
116. 407 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
117. Id.at 288.
118. Id.
119. See M. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITY AND REMEDIEs 6-6
(1985).
120. Id. at 6-6.1 to 6-7.
121. Id.at 6-7. Still another view by the Eighth Circuit focuses on whether the defendant is uniquely positioned to ask relevant questions, receive material information or disclose his knowledge. See Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 886 (8th Cir. 1977).
122. Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and How it
Compares with Rule 10b-5, 13 Hous. L. REV. 231 (1976).
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lating to the sale of exempt securities. 123 If the reasonable care standard of section 12(2) is construed liberally, section 12(2) can be a
powerful remedy for an aggrieved purchaser, 124 and a potential source
of liability for broker-dealers. Broker-dealers involved in the sale and
purchase of Regulation D securities are susceptible to section 12(2)
liability even in the absence of fraud.1 25 Furthermore, potential section 12(2) liability is greatly expanded since reliance is not an element
of the cause of action. 126 Section 12(2) does, however, provide a
"quasi due diligence" defense to the seller if the seller can establish
that he did not know of the material misstatement or omission and, in
the exercise of reasonable care, 127 could not have known of the material misstatement or omission. 12 Consequently, for a broker-dealer
who has been found to be a seller, the outer limit of a broker-dealer's
required degree of responsibility is determined by the "reasonable
care" standard in section 12(2).129
1.

Section 12(2)'s Reasonable Care: A CircumstantialStandard
Reasonable care under section 12(2) is the exercise of ordinary care
under the circumstances. 3 ° Consequently, liability will depend upon
a combination of several factors. Liability will turn on the extent to
123. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 18, at 278; see also HAZEN, supra note 9, at 310.
124. See STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 410.
125. Id.; see also supra note 9, 78.
126. See Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 356-57 (10th Cir. 1970). Plaintiff need not
prove he relied on misleading statements or material omission(s) in a § 12(2) action. Id.
It has been recognized that once the plaintiff is successful in proving a material omission,
reliance will be presumed. See Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 177 (8th Cir. 1982)
(reliance is presumed when a material omission is proved); Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff need not show he ever received the
misleading prospectus), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1982). Plaintiff does, however, need
to show some causal connection between the challenged communication and the sale even
if not decisive. See Austin, 675 F.2d at 179; Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826, 830 n.8
(2d Cir. 1976).
127. Cf Securities Act of 1933, § 12 (2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2). Reasonable care is that
which is "required of a prudent man in the management of his own property." Securities
Act of 1933, § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1982).
128. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). Section 12 provides
that a seller may escape liability if he can sustain the "burden of proof that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission .... " Id. (emphasis added).
129. Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
130. See Davis v. Avco Fin. Serv., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1068 (6th Cir. 1984) (defendant
may escape liability by showing an exercise of ordinary care). In tort law, the conduct of
a reasonable person is said to vary with the situation. See W. P. KEETON & W. L.
PROSSER, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 175 (1984).
In Davis, the Sixth Circuit considered the following factors to determine whether a
person [broker-dealer] has exercised due care:
(1) The quantum of decisional (planning) and facilitative (promotional) partici-
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which the broker-dealer was involved in the preparation of the transaction;' 3 ' the nature of the selling effort by the broker-dealer in soliciting the purchase order;132 the degree of sophistication of the buyer; 133
the prior relationship between the broker-dealer and the issuer; and
the extent to which reliance is placed upon the broker's
34
recommendation. 1
pation, such as designing the deal and contacting and attempting to persuade
potential purchasers,
(2) access to source data against which the truth or falsity of representation can
be tested,
(3) relative skill in feireting out the truth,.
(4) pecuniary interest in the completion of the transaction, and
(5) the existence of a relationship of trust and confidence between the plaintiff
and the alleged "seller."
Davis, 739 F.2d at 1068.
131. Unlike an underwriter who is intimately involved in the preparation of the prospectus, see generally HANDBOOK, supra note 28, §§ 3.01-3.04, 6.13, the broker-dealer
will not normally be intimately involved in the preparation of the prospectus, because
there is generally a lack of any disclosure statement. Seldin, Who Cares About Accredited
Investor?, 15 REV. OF SEC. REG. 810 (1982). Even the court in Sanders v. Nuveen & Co.
suggested that the special relationship between an underwriter and an issuer is such that
it will require an investigation. 619 F.2d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir, 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1005 (1982). It left open, however, the question of what reasonable care would be if
the defendant had not been an underwriter. Id. Consequently, absent some special relationship, the broker-dealer should not incur liability under § 12(2). Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'dper curiam, 512 F.2d 484 (5th
Cir. 1975).
132. At one extreme are situations where a salesman or representative of the brokerdealer actively solicits purchase orders through aggressive telephone solicitation- a
practice known as "boiler room" operations. The duty of care placed on the seller is
greater than what would be required as reasonable care. HAZEN, supra note 9, at 278-79.
Broker-dealers should not encounter this situation under Regulation D because general
solicitation is prohibited, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1988), and Regulation D provides a
purchaser with a "reasonable time prior to his purchase of securities ... to ask questions
and receive answers concerning the terms and conditions of the offering .. " 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.502(b)(v) (1988). On the other hand, if the broker-dealer acted solely as executor
in carrying out the transaction, he does not owe any duty to investigate the securities in
question. Canizaro,370 F. Supp. at 287. Similarly, if the broker acts as principal, he acts
for no one and owes no duty to the purchaser. See S. GOLDBERG, FRAUDULENT BROKER-DEALER PRACTICES 1-11 (1978).
133. Private offering purchasers are deemed to be sophisticated and able to "fend for
themselves." SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). The SEC has stated that
those purchasers under Rule 506 must have the requisite level of sophistication. SEC
Release No. 33-6455, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
2380, 2637-11, -12 n.42 (1983). Since this
prerequisite applies to both accredited and non-accredited purchasers, it may then be
construed to mean that all purchasers under Regulation D must be sophisticated. If the
plaintiff is financially sophisticated, and has prior experience in engaging in speculative
investments, the burden on the seller to disclose information is less demanding. Phillips
v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249, 1255-56 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (broker is liable under
Rule lOb-5 for failure to disclose information due in part to sophistication of purchaser).
134. S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 132 (1984 & Supp.
1987).
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Because a broker-dealer may incur liability under section 12(2) for
material misstatements or omissions about the issuer and is held to

the reasonable care standard, 3 5 the broker-dealer is under a duty to
investigate the securities. His recommendation to purchase the securities implies that he made a reasonable investigation. 36 It is further
implied that his recommendation rests on conclusions drawn from his
investigation.' 37 The broker-dealer's duty to his customer, the purchaser, is to investigate and disclose all material facts,' 3 8 and that

duty will increase
in direct proportion -to the degree of his participa139
sale.
the
in
tion
2.

Sanders: Due Diligence

In Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., ' 40 Nuveen, an exclusive underwriter of commercial paper, was held liable for using a materially misleading prospectus,' even though in preparing the prospectus, the
underwriter had relied on certified financial statements prepared by

an independent accounting firm.' 42 The Seventh Circuit interpreted
the reasonable care standard of section 12(2) as requiring a reasonable
investigation by the underwriter of the securities. 4 3 Consequently,
the court applied the due diligence standard of section 11'. and held
135. See supra note 116, infra notes 146-65 and accompanying text.
136. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969) (broker-dealer's recommendation
implies that reasonable investigation has been made).
137. Id.
138. Rule 12b-2 defines materiality as:
The term "material," when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of
information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters
to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered.
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1988).
139. See Quincy Co-Operative Bank v. A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc., [1986-87 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 92,958, 94,680 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 1986) ("broker's
duty to his customers to investigate and disclose all material facts increases in direct
proportion to the degree of his participation in the sale"). Similarly, a reasonable care
standard imposes a "sliding scale of standards" of conduct that places a continuous duty
to investigate the security of an exclusive dealer. Franklin Sav. Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d
521, 527 (2d Cir. 1977).
140. 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981).
141. Id.at 1227.
142. Id.at 1228.
143. Id. at 1227-28.
144. Id. at 1228. Section 11(b) of the Securities Act provides a due diligence defense.
See Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (discussing
due diligence). Section 1l(b) provides in relevant part:
[N]o person, other than the issuer, shall be liable [and] ... who shall sustain the
burden of proof that:
(A) as regards any part of the registration statement not purporting to be made
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that because the defendant failed to investigate the certified financial
statements, he had failed to exercise reasonable care.145
In essence, the Sanders court equated the reasonable care standard
in section 12(2) with the reasonable investigation standard in section
11.146 In doing so, the court found no significance in the difference in
language between "reasonable investigation" found in section 11 and
"reasonable care" found in section 12(2) of the Securities Act. 147
Moreover, the court held that an underwriter, because of his position, has much greater opportunity to obtain information. 14 Consequently, the broker-dealer's responsibility is not comparable to that of
the underwriter. 4 9 Rather, it appears that a broker-dealer's responsi-

bility will turn on the facts and circumstances of each case.' 5 ° The
Supreme Court denied certiorari,151 with Justice Powell writing a vig1 52
orous dissent in which Justice Rehnquist joined.
Justice Powell argued that the Seventh Circuit had misinterpreted
section 12(2) as requiring reasonable investigation. ' 53 He feared that
the decision would be read by courts and broker-dealers as requiring
an independent financial investigation rather than permitting reliance
on the financial statements provided by an issuer.' 54 Accordingly,
Justice Powell would allow a broker-dealer to rely on a certified financial statement of the issuer. 155 To require further investigation would
on the authority of an expert... he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration
statement became effective, that the statements therein were true and that there
was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading; ... and (C) as regards any
part of the registration statement purporting to be made on the authority of an
expert (other than himself) ... he had no reasonable ground to believe and did
not believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective,
that the statements therein were untrue or that there was an omission to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading ....
Securities Act of 1933, § 11(b) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 7,7k(b) (1982).
145. Sanders, 619 F.2d at 1227-28.
146. Id. at 1228.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 450 U.S. 1005 (1981).
152. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
153. Sanders, 450 U.S. at 1009-10 (Powell, J. dissenting).
154. Id. at 1011 (Powell, J. dissenting). This would impose a greater burden than what
is already required under § 1 's due diligence standard. Section 11 allows a defendant to
rely on the expert opinion of others. Id. at 1010 (Powell, J. dissenting). See supra notes
20, 143.
155. Sanders, 450 U.S. at 1010 (Powell, J. dissenting).
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place a greater burden on the broker-dealer than is required by the
156
statutory scheme.
IV.

Recommendations as to Liability of a Broker-Dealer in
Regulation D Transactions

A broker-dealer's liability under section 12(2) with respect to Regulation D securities should depend on several factors: (1) the role of the
broker-dealer in preparation of the transaction;15 7 (2) the prior relationship between the purchaser and broker-dealer;158 (3) the nature of
the selling effort;159 (4) the sophistication of the purchaser;' 6' and (5)
'the availability of public information.' 6 '
Regulation D was promulgated in recognition of the fact that small
issues, because of their size, 162 and the nature of the purchaser, 1 63 do
not warrant the protection of the registration requirement. 164 Likewise, the requirement of a reasonable investigation should not be imposed. 165 Rather, liability should turn on the circumstances of the
156. Id. (Powell, J. dissenting).
157. Cf Sanders, 619 F.2d at 1228. The Seventh Circuit explained that an underwriter
is held to a higher standard of duty because of his intimate relationship with the registration statement. Accordingly, a broker-dealer who is an "underwriter" for purposes of the
offering and who, therefore, has a strong connection with the preparation of the prospectus, should be held to a higher degree of care. Id.
158. A broker is charged with the duty of knowing the suitability of the stock for his
customer. Clark v. John Lamula Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1978). Under the
"know your customer rule" the broker is required to consider the financial condition and
circumstances of the customer. JAFFE, supra note 98, at 250. Since Regulation D requires that purchasers be sophisticated, SEC Release No. 33-6455, FED. SEC. L. REP. Q
& A 73, 2380 (Feb. 5, 1986), and be accredited in the case of Rule 505 and Rule 506
offerings, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505-230.506 (1987), it follows that a broker-dealer must know
the financial status of the purchaser. In addition, Rule 506 expressly requires that the
offeror have a reasonable belief that the purchaser is capable of evaluating the securities
based on financial knowledge and experience. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(1)(ii) (1987). If the
broker-dealer was involved in the transaction as an agent for the customer, it would be
unlikely that he would incur liability. Douglas & Bates, supra note 100, at 207. Further,
if the broker-dealer increases his involvement, such as by solicitation, then his probability
of incurring liability will increase. Id.
159. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
160. See infra note 161.
161. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
162. In the case of Regulation D, the maximum amount under Rule 504 is $500,000.
17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1987). Under Rule 505, the maximum amount is $5,000,000. 17
C.F.R. § 230.505 (1987). Under Rule 506, the offering has no maximum amount limitation. It does, however, impose a purchaser restriction by requiring offeree sophistication
and limiting sales to 35 non-accredited purchasers. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1987).
163. See supra notes 42-73 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 24-25.
165. Reasonable investigation in this context is required under § 11 to escape liability.
Rule 176 provides guidelines as to what constitutes reasonable investigation under section
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selling effort and the broker-dealer's participation in the preparation
of the transaction.' 66 Further, protection of a full registration statement is not warranted because Regulation D generally requires that
purchasers be sophisticated.' 6 7
The absence of a disclosure requirement in Regulation D is also
indicative of the SEC's faith in the financial sophistication of the purchasers of Regulation D offerings. 6 ' Issues under Rule 504 require
no disclosure. 169 In addition, Rules 505 and 506 only require specific
information to be furnished in the event of purchases by non-accredited investors. 70 Rules 505 and 506 also require that an issuer make
available to each purchaser an opportunity to ask questions and receive answers concerning the offerings.' 7 ' They also provide, however, that any information sought from the issuer need not involve
unreasonable effort or expense. 172 The lack of any specific disclosure
requirement suggests that because of the financial status of Regulation
D purchasers and the sophistication inferred from that status, pur73
chasers do not need the protection of the registration.
The absence of a required disclosure statement alleviates the burden
1 l(c) of the Securities Act. 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1987). Among the factors to be consid(b) [t]he type of security ... (c) [t]he type of person
.... " 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1988).
Under Regulation D, when the offering (with the exception of Rule 506) is less than
$5,000,000, no investigation is required under the Rules. It may, however, be prudent to
ascertain the financial suitability of the purchaser. See supra note 158. When the offer is
governed by Rule 506 (presumably over $5,000,000), the offeror has a duty to ascertain
the financial sophistication of the purchaser. 17 C.F.R. § 506(b)(2)(ii) (1987). Accordingly, since the purchasers are deemed to be sophisticated and financially stable, the broker-dealer need not go through the expense of a "due diligence" investigation as required
in Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (underwriter
has duty to make reasonable investigation under § 11 of the Securities Act).
166. See supra notes 119, 132.
167. See supra note 162.
168. See SEC Release No. 33-6455, Fed. Sec. L. Rep., Q & A 73, 2380 (Feb. 15,
1986).
169. Rule 504 requires no disclosure unless specifically required under state blue sky
laws. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (1987).
170. See id.
171. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(v) (1987).
172. Id.
173. In a brief filed by the SEC in Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., the SEC stated that:
Since Congress has determined that registration is not necessary in certain defined situations [exempt offerings], we believe that it would undermine the
[c]ongressional intent-that issuers and other persons should be relieved of registration-if the same degree of investigation were to be required to avoid potential liability whether or not a registration is required.
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 450 U.S. 1005, 1009, (1982) (Powell, J. dissenting) (quoting Brief for the SEC, Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1982)).
ered are: "(a) [t]he type of issue ...
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on broker-dealers to investigate issuers, and justifiably so, because it is
already recognized that private offerings are available only to purchasers who are able to fend for themselves. 74 It should be recognized, however, that in instances where the Regulation D exemptions
are utilized by small companies to gain start-up capital, a more thor-

ough investigation into the stability of the company should be
required. '75
A reasonable investigation will also be required in certain instances
as an exercise of reasonable care. 176 This exercise of reasonable care,
however, should not require investigation beyond a professionally cer177
tified statement or report.
V. Conclusion
A pragmatic approach to section 12(2) is to construe "reasonable
care" in light of the circumstances of each case. In the case of Regulation D transactions, the reasonable care standard is less exacting
than the due diligence or reasonable investigation standard. 178 It
would be contrary to the statutory language to impose a duty of reasonable investigation when the statute explicitly provides for a reasonable care standard.

79

Because Regulation D offerings are made to

those who are sophisticated and knowledgeable in financial matters, it
would subvert the purpose of Regulation D to place upon brokerdealers the same duty of care as if they were involved in registered
transactions. Moreover, broker-dealers involved in Regulation D offerings do not have the same intimate involvement as an underwriter
174. See SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (private offering is available only
to those who are able to fend for themselves); see also Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631,
633 (10th Cir. 1971) (requiring that offerees have exceptional business background or
equivalent level of sophistication).
175. Because Regulation D is intended to be used by small companies to gain capital
without the burden of registration, or by companies of recent origin to acquire start-up
capital, a thorough investigation may be in order when the securities are speculative. See
Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 598-99 (2d Cir. 1969). The SEC has also recommended that
when the securities are offered in connection with high risk or speculative ventures, a
diligent investigation may be required. See SEC Release Nos. 33-5275, 34-96712, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. $ 4506b, 4052 (July 26, 1972).
176. See SEC Release Nos. 33-5275, 34-96712, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
4506b, 4052 (July
26, 1972).
177. Section 11 of the Securities Act, which imposes a reasonable investigation duty,
provides that potential defendants may rely on "any part of the registration statement
purporting to be made on authority of expert ....
Securities Act of 1933, § lI(b)(3)(C),
15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C) (1982).
178. Douglas & Bates, supra note 100, at 208 n.205.
179. The courts should look first to the language of the statute. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). See also Reasonable Care, supra note 9, at 379-87;
Douglas & Bates, supra note 100, at 171-73.
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has in a public offering. Such broker-dealers should not, therefore,
have the burden of a due diligence investigation.
Matthew Joonho Jeon

